|
|
3220 M Street Telephone: (916) 492-6555 Facsimile: (916) 492-6556 ©2007 The Ison Law Group |
Supreme Court Eases Burden on Plaintiffs in
Discrimination Cases
Employees
who sue for discrimination may now find it easier to prove discrimination, or
at least get their cases past summary judgment and to a jury. A unanimous June
9, 2003 decision by the United States Supreme Court held that direct evidence
of discrimination is not required in order for an employee to get a "mixed
motive" jury instruction in a Title VII case .
Instead, the Court held that circumstantial evidence is enough to get a
"mixed motive" charge. A "mixed motive" instruction tells
the jurors that if the employees' mistreatment was motivated by both gender (a
protected characteristic) and lawful reasons, she was entitled to damages
unless the employer could show it would have fired her regardless of her
gender. This decision held that direct evidence that she was fired because she
was a woman was not required.
Caesar's
Palace Employee Brought Suit
The
case was brought by Catherine Costa, an employee of Caesar's Palace Hotel &
Casino of Las Vegas, Nevada. Costa was employed as a warehouse worker and heavy
equipment operator. Costa was the only woman in this job and in her local
Teamsters bargaining unit.
Costa
experienced a number of problems with management and her co-workers that led to
an escalating series of disciplinary sanctions, including informal rebukes, a
denial of privileges, and suspension. The hotel finally terminated Costa after
she was involved in a physical altercation in a warehouse elevator with a
fellow teamster member who was male.
Costa
filed a lawsuit against the hotel asserting claims of sex discrimination and
sexual harassment under Title VII. The sexual harassment claim was dismissed,
but the sex discrimination claim proceeded to trial.
Trial
Court Allows Mixed Motive Jury Instruction
At trial,
Costa presented evidence that (1) she was singled out for "intense
stalking" by one of her supervisors, (2) she received harsher discipline
than men for the same conduct, (3) she was treated less favorably than men in
the assignment of overtime, and (4) supervisors repeatedly "stacked"
her disciplinary record and frequently used or tolerated sex-based slurs
against her.
Based
on this evidence, the district court submitted the case to the jury with a
mixed motive instruction that read in part: "If you find that the
plaintiff's sex was a motivating factor in the defendant's treatment of the
plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your verdict, even if you find that the
defendant's conduct was also motivated by a lawful reason." The
instruction further read: "The plaintiff is entitled to damages unless the
defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant would
have treated plaintiff similarly even if the plaintiff's gender had played no
role in the employment decision."
The
trial court issued this instruction despite the employer's claim that Costa
adduced no direct evidence that sex was a motivating factor in its decision.
The employer argued that the burden shifting analysis provided for in other
cases only allowed a mixed-motive instruction in the "rare" cases
where direct evidence of discriminatory motive is clear. Direct evidence is
generally any written or verbal policy or statement that demonstrates a bias
against a protected group and is linked to the employment action that is
claimed to be discriminatory.
The
jury rendered a verdict for Costa awarding over $64,000 in back pay, $200,000
in general damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. The general damages were
later reduced to $100,000.
Heightened
Showing of Discrimination through Direct Evidence Not Required
The
Supreme Court upheld the district court's decision to give a "mixed
motive" instruction. The Supreme Court's decision clarified that a worker
is only required to demonstrate that her employer used a forbidden characteristic
- sex - as a motivating factor in its decision to terminate her, even if
legitimate factors also were motivating factor. The law does not require an
employee to make a heightened showing of discrimination through direct
evidence. Rather, a worker may demonstrate that an employer used a forbidden
consideration with respect to an employment practice through direct or
circumstantial evidence.
Justice
Thomas, writing the opinion for the unanimous court, based the decision on the
statutory text of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Thomas said that the Act
unambiguously states that a plaintiff need only "demonstrate" that an
employer used a forbidden characteristic with respect to "any employment
practice." As a result, Thomas concluded, "on its face, the statute
does not mention, much less require, plaintiff make a heightened showing
through direct evidence."
Moreover,
Justice Thomas said that since the statute says nothing about the type of
evidence necessary in a mixed-motive case, "we should not depart from the
conventional rule of civil ligation" that
generally allows a plaintiff to use direct or circumstantial evidence. In fact,
"circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more
certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence."
Impact
of the Case
This
case clears the way for all plaintiffs to secure a mixed motive instruction if
there is enough evidence of any sort to challenge an employer's stated reasons
for its actions. The decision may make it easier for more cases to get past the
summary judgment stage. Often all a plaintiff has is circumstantial evidence,
and the decision is likely to result in more cases going to the jury.
Employers
should note that the decision is limited to cases falling under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, and does not apply to age discrimination claims under the
Age Discrimination and Employment Act, for example. Several federal courts
continue to require direct evidence in ADEA cases before a plaintiff may
receive a mixed-motive instruction.