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EMPLOYEE CANNOT SUE UNDER TITLE VII BASED ON THE CONTINUING EFFECT OF PAST PAY DISCRIMINATION
In Ledbetter v. Good Year Tire & Rubber Company, Inc., 550 U.S. ___ (May 29, 2007), the United States Supreme Court held that federal gender discrimination laws do not permit employees to sue for pay discrimination that occurred several years in the past.
In a 5-4 decision, the court stated that a pay-setting decision is a “discrete act of discrimination,” and that a plaintiff seeking to sue based on such a discrete act in violation of federal law must do so within the limitations period (either 180 or 300 days, depending on the state). The court rejected the plaintiff’s continuing violation theory, stating that the “current effects” of past pay-setting decisions (i.e., a lower salary than similarly- situated male employees) “could not breathe life into prior, uncharged discrimination.”
The Law
Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) prohibits various forms of
employment discrimination, including sex-based discrimination in employee
compensation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). If an employee elects to sue under Title VII,
the employee must first file a timely charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The limitations period is either 180 or
300 days, depending on the state. (Note: 300 days in
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
The
plaintiff in Ledbetter worked for Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company in
At trial, the jury found that Ledbetter received “poor evaluations because of her sex” on various occasions during her 20 years of employment. As a result, Ledbetter’s pay “was not increased as much as it would have been if she had been evaluated fairly.” The jury also found that discrimination in pay-setting decisions “continued to affect the amount of her pay throughout her employment.” Importantly, however, Ledbetter offered no evidence of a discriminatory pay-setting decision after September 26, 1997 – that is, within the EEOC filing period.
On these facts, the court determined that Ledbetter could not state a viable Title VII pay discrimination claim. A discriminatory pay-setting decision is a “discrete” unlawful act, and a Title VII claim premised on such a discrete act must be brought within the statutory limitations period. Because the discriminatory acts alleged by Ledbetter all occurred more than 180 days prior the date she filed her EEOC charge, her Title VII claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
In reaching this conclusion, the Ledbetter court considered and rejected the plaintiff’s “paycheck accrual” theory, under which each new paycheck would trigger a new EEOC charging period because it “carried forward intentionally discriminatory disparities from prior years.” The court stated that “Ledbetter should have filed an EEOC charge within 180 days after each allegedly discriminatory pay decision was made and communicated to her. She did not do so, and the paychecks that were issued to her during the 180 days prior to the filing of her EEOC charge do not provide a basis for overcoming that prior failure.” Instead, citing its own decision in United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), the court concluded that “[a] discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge … is merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal consequences.”
Practical Tips
Ledbetter is the latest in a series of cases decided by the United States Supreme Court that limit the scope and application of Title VII protections. While Ledbetter is certainly a victory for employers, keep in mind that it only applies to Title VII claims.
Ledbetter does not necessarily impact claims asserted against
For
now,